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Article
Mask, Shield, and Sword: Should the
Journalist's Privilege Protect the Identity
of Anonymous Posters to News Media
Websites?
Jane E. Kirtleyt
The editorial board of the Daily Herald in Wausau, Wis-
consin, probably never thought it would ignite a national con-
troversy when it named Dean Zuleger, the Administrator of
Weston Village, as Person of the Year in December 2008.1 But
perhaps it should have. Within hours, angry Wausau residents
began posting negative comments about the selection on the
newspaper's website-anonymously, of course. They criticized
Zuleger's weight, his $118,000 (plus bonuses) salary, and his
management style. 2 Not surprisingly, the Wausau Daily Herald
shut down and removed the comments within a week.3
But Zuleger was not satisfied. Presumably smarting from
the criticism, he decided to find out who was responsible for it.
He contacted the newspaper and demanded that it identify the
anonymous poster, whose screen name was "juanmoore."4 The
editor of the 20,000 circulation Wausau Daily Herald5 gave Zu-
leger his critic's e-mail address, which the critic had provided
when he registered to post comments on the site.6 Zuleger, in
t Silha Professor of Media Ethics and Law, School of Journalism and
Mass Communication, University of Minnesota. Copyright C 2010 by Jane E.
Kirtley.
1. Ryan J. Foley, Wis. Paper Faces Backlash for Outing Web Critic, ABC
NEws, Sept. 17, 2009, http://abcnews.go.comlUS/wireStoryid=8603777.
2. Posting of Jim Hopkins to Gannett Blog, Timeline: Anatomy of a Disas-
ter in Wausau, Wis., http://gannettblog.blogspot.com/2009/04/timeline-anatomy
-of-disaster-in-wausau.html (Apr. 26, 2009, 00:19 PST).
3. Id.
4. Foley, supra note 1.
5. See Hopkins, supra note 2.
6. Foley, supra note 1.
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turn, fired off an angry letter on official stationery in April
2009, demanding that the commenter, a businessman named
Paul Klocko, stop posting personal attacks, "come out from be-
hind the cloak," and meet him in person at his office.7
When Klocko complained to the Daily Herald, it apologized
for its actions.8 And as a consequence, according to the Asso-
ciated Press, the newspaper's corporate parent, Gannett Com-
pany, has "clarified" its policy on identifying anonymous com-
menters.9 It will do so only in cases where it is ordered to do so
by a court, or when a comment threatens "imminent harm."o
Online commentators were quick to condemn the newspa-
per for providing the information to Zuleger. For example, on
the Consumer Law & Policy Blog, Paul Levy wrote:
[L]o and behold, the paper just turned over one critic's identity.
Not only without notice to the blog poster, apparently, but without
even a subpoena or other court order.
There are, of course, [Internet Service Providers] who give up this
information too easily, but you'd think that a newspaper, with its un-
derstanding of the importance of anonymous sources, would know
better than that.II
Should the Daily Herald have known better? Should it
have treated its pseudonymous commenter as a type of confi-
dential source, demanded a subpoena, and then gone to the mat
to protect his identity? Or should it have at' least notified
Klocko that the angry Zuleger was eager to unmask him, and
invited the poster to resist the demand if he cared to?
At least one commentator in the mainstream media says
"no." In his Miami Herald column, Edward Wasserman, the
Knight Professor of Journalism Ethics at Washington and Lee
University, wrote: "[T]here's a powerful current in favor of giv-
ing anonymous posters exactly the same protection that jour-
nalists fight to win for confidential sources. And that's a bad
idea."12
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Posting of Paul Levy to Consumer Law & Policy Blog, http://pubcit.type
pad.com/clpblog/2009/09/gannett-shamed-into-changing-policy-on-responding-to
-request-to-identify-blog-comments.html (Sept. 18, 2009, 18:07 EST).
12. Edward Wasserman, Limit Anonymity for Internet Critics, MIAMI HE-
RALD, Sept. 28, 2009, http://www.miamiherald.comlopinion/other-views/story/
1255416.html.
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Although acknowledging that newspapers in other states,
including Oregon, Montana, and Illinois, have fought to keep
the identity of their anonymous commenters secret, Wasser-
man argues that "anonymous posters are nothing like confiden-
tial sources."13 As a rule, he points out, news organizations
know who their confidential sources are, and what their agen-
das and biases may be.14 They vouch for the credibility of their
sources to their readers and viewers, and by relying on them,
put their own credibility on the line. By contrast, the identities
of posters are "truly unknown," and "no one even tries to verify
the information from the anonymous poster." 15 Wasserman
concludes that "claiming for anonymous posters the protections
that confidential sources deserve debases the currency,
mak[ing] a whistleblower no different from a crank. As an ethi-
cal matter, it's indefensible."16
Constitutional law recognizes that speakers enjoy a quali-
fied right to remain anonymous.17 But competing reputational,
privacy, copyright, or law enforcement interests may outweigh
that right. 18 A news organization is not a government actor. It
has no legal obligation to protect the First Amendment rights of
others. Any contractual obligation it does have presumably
would be limited to the undertakings set forth in the news or-
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S.
182, 200 (1999) (finding unconstitutional a requirement that petition circula-
tors wear name badges); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,
357 (1995) (holding that a statutory provision prohibiting distribution of ano-
nymous campaign literature violated the First Amendment). The high court
has made clear that First Amendment protections apply to speech on the In-
ternet. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
18. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-20 (2003) (noting that
certain copyright protections do not infringe First Amendment rights); Rowan
v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (upholding a mailing ban in
order to protect the privacy of the recipients). Because courts have concluded
that the speech of alleged copyright infringers is of little value, unmasking
anonymous infringers generally requires simply an allegation that the in-
fringement occurred and that there is a "danger that the ISP will not preserve
the information sought," even if there is no lawsuit pending. See Ashley I. Kis-
singer & Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane and John: Can the Media Protect
Anonymous Online Speech?, COMM. LAW., July 2009, at 4, 7 (quoting Arista
Records, LLC v. Does 1-9, No. 2:07-CV-961, 2008 WL 2982265, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio July 29, 2008)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (discussing subpoena
requirements).
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ganization's Terms of Service or Privacy Policy.19 As for media
ethics, the Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional Journal-
ists, the largest voluntary association of its kind in the United
States, cautions that journalists should "[a]lways question
sources' motives before promising anonymity," "[c]larify condi-
tions attached to any promise made in exchange for informa-
tion," and "keep promises."20 Who is right? Is it indefensible for
a news organization to "out" an anonymous commenter? Or is it
indefensible to resist?
This Article will examine the emerging law as courts con-
sider whether to extend the journalist's privilege to protect
anonymous "Jane and John Doe" posters on news organiza-
tions' websites. And it will consider the ethical as well as legal
dilemmas that these cases raise for news organizations. Part I
discusses the variety of legal tests that have emerged from the
lower courts in balancing anonymous speech against other
competing interests. Part II then discusses the phenomenon of
greater interactivity in the new media and its consequences,
both positive and negative. Part III explores the media ethics
considerations arising from the protection of anonymous
speech, and Part IV concludes by identifying some as yet un-
answered questions.
I. STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN ANONYMOUS
SPEECH AND OTHER COMPETING INTERESTS
Because First Amendment rights are not absolute, courts
have struggled to balance the rights of an anonymous speaker
to express her views against the competing rights of other indi-
viduals to seek redress for reputational injury or violations of
personal privacy. 21 The rough and tumble world of the Internet
encourages robust debate and discussion, but also invites ad
hominem attacks and unsubstantiated accusations by anonym-
ous speakers. Individuals and corporations who wish to sue
face a number of obstacles.
19. See, e.g., S.F. Chronicle, Privacy Policy (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www
.sfgate.com/pages/privacy/ [hereinafter S.F. Chronicle Policy]; Wall Street
Journal, The Wall Street Journal and Barron's Privacy Policy, (Sept. 16,
2008), http://online.wsj.com/public/page/privacy-policy.html [hereinafter Wall
Street Journal and Barron's Policy].
20. Soc'Y OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS 1 (1996), available at
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.pdf.
21. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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The Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunizes In-
ternet companies and website owners (ISPs) from liability for
defamatory content posted by commenters, 2 2 and has been
broadly construed by the courts.2 3 As a result, a potential plain-
tiff typically commences his lawsuit by filing a complaint
against an anonymous "Jane or John Doe," and then asks a
judge to issue a discovery subpoena to be served on a third par-
ty who owns the website, provides the poster with Internet ser-
vice, or both.24 It is also possible to sue the website or ISP, and
then serve a discovery request on that defendant. 25 But in ei-
ther case, the object is the same: to unmask the anonymous
poster. The website will be asked for all "identifying informa-
tion" regarding the anonymous or pseudonymous poster, in-
cluding the Internet protocol (IP) address assigned to the post-
er's computer. 2 6 The IP address identifies the poster's ISP,
which in turn, will be asked for the account information of the
owner, including name, address and telephone number.27
As scholars Larissa Lidsky and Thomas Cotter have noted,
the Supreme Court has provided little guidance to lower courts
attempting to develop a rubric to balance the conflicting rights
of speakers and subjects in this context.28 Accordingly, a varie-
ty of tests have emerged from the lower courts. A critical aspect
of each test is how heavy a burden should be imposed on the
plaintiff before he can force disclosure of the poster's identify-
ing information.
22. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
23. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330, 335 (4th Cir.
1997) (noting immunity for internet service providers, even for actions occur-
ring prior to the enactment of the CDA).
24. For example, in Best Western International, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-
1537, 2008 WL 4630313, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 20, 2006), the plaintiff filed suit
against John Doe defendants and then sought expedited discovery of third-
party ISPs.
25. See, e.g., Pub. Relations Soc'y of Am. v. Road Runner High Speed On-
line, 799 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
26. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089-91
(W.D. Wash. 2001).
27. See Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consis-
tent Legal Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 327-29 (2008).
28. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences,
and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2007).
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A. THE "MOTION TO DISMIss" TEST
One of the first cases to consider the Jane and Jon Doe is-
sue was Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com. 29 In this
trademark infringement suit, See's Candy sought the identity
of an anonymous "cybersquatter" who had registered multiple
similar domain names in hopes of selling them back to the
manufacturer. 30 The court held that the valid trademark inter-
est asserted needed to be balanced against the "right to partici-
pate in online forums anonymously or pseudonymously." 31 Re-
cognizing that too lenient a standard would permit litigants to
use the discovery process to harass anonymous speakers,32 the
court established a test requiring the plaintiff to: (1) provide
sufficiently specific facts to identify the missing party "as a real
person or entity who could be sued in federal court," (2) identify
steps the plaintiff has taken to locate the defendant, (3) estab-
lish that the suit would be able to withstand a motion to dis-
miss, and (4) file a discovery request and a "statement of rea-
sons justifying the specific discovery requested" with the
court. 33
The court's test leaves open the question of how much evi-
dence of an underlying claim would be required. However, some
commentators have pointed out that despite its reference to
simply "withstand[ing] a motion to dismiss,"34 the court actual-
ly set a higher standard than would be required under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by requiring the plaintiff to
make some showing that an act giving rise to civil liability ac-
tually occurred and that the discovery is aimed at revealing
specific identifying features of the person or entity who com-
mitted that act.35
B. THE "GOOD FAITH" TEST
The earliest articulation of the "good faith" test arose in In
re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.36 The plain-
tiff company (which, ironically, chose to proceed anonymously)
29. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
30. Id. at 576.
31. Id. at 578.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 578-80.
34. Id. at 579.
35. Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 18, at 6.
36. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Am.
Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
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sought the identity of five John Does who it claimed had pub-
lished defamatory factual misrepresentations and "confidential
material insider information" on an Internet chat room forum. 37
Adopting a three-part test, the court required the plaintiff to
satisfy the court by the pleadings or evidence, that it had a legi-
timate good faith basis for its claim, and that the defendants'
identities were central to the claim.38 Although recognizing the
right to anonymous speech, the court concluded, without elabo-
ration, that the company had met its burden.39 This test is
sometimes referred to as the "Virginia test."4 0
A similar test which, when applied resulted in a different
outcome, was adopted by the federal district court in Doe v.
2TheMart.com Inc.41 The court rejected a request to unmask a
group of anonymous Internet posters who commented about the
company on an Internet message board and were later sought
as witnesses in a stockholders' derivative suit. 42 This four-part
balancing test, which resembles the qualified reporter's privi-
lege recognized in many jurisdictions, requires a clear showing
that: (1) the subpoena be issued in good faith and not for an
improper purpose, (2) the information sought be relevant to a
core claim or defense, (3) the identifying information be directly
and materially relevant, and (4) the information be unavailable
from any other source. 43 The court in this case found that the
company defending the derivative suit had failed to demon-
strate that the identities of the speakers were material to its
case.
44
37. Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 37. In 2002, the Virginia General Assembly codified a version of
the test. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1(A)(1) (2007).
39. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. at 37.
Subsequently, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed, finding it was unclear if
the "Anonymous Publicly Traded Company" could exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendants in Indiana, where the underlying lawsuit was filed.
See Am. Online, Inc., 542 S.E.2d at 383. The court also held that the plaintiff
company failed to meet its burden to demonstrate why it should be allowed to
proceed anonymously. Id. at 385.
40. See, e.g., Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 18, at 7 (noting the Virginia
test).
41. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
42. Id. at 1097.
43. Id. at 1095.
44. Id. at 1097.
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C. THE PRIMA FACIE OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TEST
In Dendrite International v. Doe No. 3, a company that
provided custom computer programming for the pharmaceuti-
cal industry claimed that a number of pseudonymous individu-
als defamed it by commenting on its quarterly report on a Ya-
hoo! message board.45 After the trial court denied Dendrite's
motion for expedited discovery, a New Jersey appeals court af-
firmed, holding that the company had failed to demonstrate
that its underlying claims had merit.46 It noted that, in a defa-
mation action, "[t]he complaint and all information provided to
the court should be carefully reviewed to determine whether
plaintiff has set forth a prima facie cause of action."47 Specifi-
cally, the court required the plaintiff to notify anonymous post-
ers that they are subject to a subpoena seeking their identity,
to specify the exact statement alleged to be defamatory, and to
produce sufficient evidence to support each element of the pri-
ma facie case. 48 The court must then balance the First Amend-
ment right of anonymous speech against the strength of the
plaintiff's prima facie case and the need for disclosure. 49 In this
instance, the court found that Dendrite failed to produce suffi-
cient evidence to support its case, particularly with regard to
evidence of harm to its reputation.50
The Dendrite test has been applied by several other state
courts, including in New York51 and Pennsylvania. 52 But per-
haps the most significant adoption-and modification-of the
test occurred when the Delaware Supreme Court decided John
45. 775 A.2d 756, 760 n.1, 762 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
46. Id. at 760.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 760-61.
50. Id. at 772.
51. See, e.g., Ottinger v. Journal News, 36 Media L. Rep. 2018, 2019 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2008) (finding the four-part Dendrite test helpful in reaching its deci-
sion); Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (Sup. Ct. 2007) ('The
court agrees with these requirements [in reference to the Dendrite test] and
has followed them here.").
52. Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ.A.03CV3218, 2004 WL
3768897, at *5 (Pa. Comm. Pl. Jan. 28, 2004) (discussing the Dendrite test). In
addition to prima facie requirements, the Pennsylvania court required the
plaintiff to demonstrate the relevance and necessity of the evidence sought to
the underlying claim, that it was seeking the information in good faith and not
for purposes of harassment, and that there were no alternative means to iden-
tify the anonymous speaker. Id. at *6.
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Doe No. 1 v. Cahill. 53 This case arose when a town council
member sued four anonymous defendants for defamation and
invasion of privacy based on critical comments they posted on a
political blog. 54 When he sought to unmask the John Doe, the
trial court applied a "good faith" standard similar to the Virgin-
ia test, finding that the plaintiff had a good faith basis on
which to obtain the identity of the poster.55
But on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected that
standard, finding it "insufficiently protective" of John Doe's
right to speak anonymously. 56 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Reno v. ACLU,67 where the Court compared an ano-
nymous online commenter to "a town crier with a voice that re-
sonates farther than it could from any soapbox" who "[t]hrough
the use of Web pages ... can become a pamphleteer,"5 8 the Ca-
hill court observed that blogs or chatrooms "can become the
modern equivalent of political pamphleteering."5 9
Although acknowledging the need to balance the competing
interests at stake in the case, the Cahill court feared that
adopting the "good faith" standard could "chill potential posters
from exercising their First Amendment right to speak anony-
mously."6 0 Accordingly, it chose to adopt its own version of the
Dendrite test, but with a difference: "[B]efore a defamation
plaintiff can obtain the identity of an anonymous defendant
through the compulsory discovery process he must support his
defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary
judgment motion."6 1 This standard, the court said, eliminated
the need to require the plaintiff to set forth the exact state-
ments complained of or to direct the court to balance the First
Amendment rights against the strength of the prima facie case,
both of which were already subsumed by the summary judg-
ment requirements. 62
53. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
54. Id. at 454. Among other things, John Doe No. 1 called Cahill a "divi-
sive impediment" and suggested that he was mentally unstable and paranoid.
Id.
55. Cahill v. John Doe No. One, 879 A.2d 943, 954-55 (Del. Super. Ct.
2005), rev'd sub nom. John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
56. John Doe No. 1, 884 A.2d at 454.
57. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
58. Id. at 870.
59. John Doe No. 1, 884 A.2d at 456.
60. Id. at 457.
61. Id. at 460.
62. Id. at 461. But see Mobilisa, Inc. v. John Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720
1486 [94:1478
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The court also reaffirmed the first part of the Dendrite
standard, requiring plaintiffs to take reasonable steps to notify
the defendants, and to refrain from acting until those defen-
dants have had a reasonable opportunity to oppose the subpoe-
na-which in this case meant that Cahill had an obligation to
post a message on the same message board where the original
defamatory statements had appeared. 63 Applying the new test,
the court concluded that Cahill had failed to demonstrate that
the defendant's statements were factual and capable of defama-
tory meaning. 64 The Cahill test has been cited frequently in
both state and federal courts 65-but not consistently. Courts
have variously interpreted the standard as more burdensome,
or less burdensome, than Dendrite.66
For example, in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,
Maryland's highest court adopted the prima facie Dendrite test,
concluding that the Cahill test "set[s] the bar too high . .. by
requiring claimants to essentially prove their case before even-
ing knowing who the commentator was."6 7 By contrast, a Cali-
fornia appeals court, describing the Cahill standard as more
stringent than a "motion to dismiss test" but less stringent
than the prima facie test, declined to "attach a procedural label,
whether summary judgment or motion to dismiss," to the re-
quired showing, but in any event, also adopted the Dendrite
standard. 68
Whether the distinction is a meaningful one can be de-
bated. But it has been suggested that the confusion engendered
by the Cahill opinion has prompted courts to move away from
the case's summary judgment formulation.69 Nevertheless, in
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the separate balancing requirement is ne-
cessary in order to allow the court to consider, for example, other factors that
might weigh against disclosure, such as the availability of alternative sources,
or the consequences of a discovery order on a particular speaker).
63. John Doe No. 1, 884 A.2d at 460-61.
64. See id. at 467 (holding that because a reasonable person would not in-
terpret the statements as factual, they were incapable of being defamatory).
65. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc., 170 P.3d at 724-26; McMann v. Doe, 460 F.
Supp. 2d 259, 266-67 (D. Mass. 2006).
66. Compare Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 243-45 (Ct. App.
2008) (less burdensome), with Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d
432, 456-57 (Md. 2009) (more burdensome).
67. Indep. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 456-57.
68. See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 243-45 (likening the Cahill test to a
motion for summary judgment, but declining to adopt the test).
69. See id. at 242-44; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace:
What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2009) (noting
2010] 1487
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August 2009, the District of Columbia's highest court relied
heavily on the Cahill decision when it articulated a new stan-
dard to be used in its jurisdiction. 70 Solers, Inc. v. Doe involved
a libel and tortious interference suit brought by a software
company claiming that it had been accused of using pirated
computer programs against an individual who had submitted
an anonymous tip to the Software & Information Industry As-
sociation (SIIA), a group that fights software piracy.7" SIIA
filed a motion to quash.72 In its ruling, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals wrote that it was striving to balance the
rights of the anonymous speaker against the right to reputa-
tion.73 The new test required that a judge:
(1) ensure that the plaintiff has adequately pleaded the elements of
the defamation claim, (2) require reasonable efforts to notify the ano-
nymous defendant that the complaint has been filed and the subpoe-
na has been served, (3) delay further action for a reasonable time to
allow the defendant an opportunity to file a motion to quash, (4) re-
quire the plaintiff to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact on each element of the claim that is within its control, and
(5) determine that the information sought is important to enable the
plaintiff to proceed with his lawsuit.74
The appellate court then remanded the case to the district
court.75
II. INTERACTIVITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
As news organizations have experimented with ways to en-
courage their readers to interact with their online news prod-
ucts, one of the most popular options has been to allow readers
to post comments adjacent to a news story. 76 Although this can
that most courts are moving towards a more balanced approach than the
summary judgment standard).
70. Solers, Inc. v. John Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 950-56 (D.C. 2009) (describing
the new test as "closely resembl[ing] the 'summary judgment' standard articu-
lated in Cahill").
71. Id. at 944-48.
72. Id. at 946.
73. Id. at 951 (citing Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)).
74. Id. at 954.
75. Id. at 958-59.
76. Among the many newspaper examples are Los Angeles Times, http://
www.latimes.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2010), San Francisco Chronicle, http://
sfgate.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2010), The New York Times, http://www
.nytimes.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2010), The Washington Post, http://www
.washingtonpost.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2010), and USA Today, http://www
.usatoday.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
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facilitate robust discussion and promote a "conversation" be-
tween journalists and their readers,77 it has also encouraged
"moronic, anonymous, unsubstantiated and often venomous
[speech]."78
This is particularly likely to occur when posters are per-
mitted to use a pseudonym, or remain anonymous.79 The usual
compromise is to require users to register with the website,
provide some form of identifying information such as a tele-
phone number or home address, and to agree to abide by (or to
at least indicate that they have read) the news organization's
Terms of Service and/or Privacy Policy.8 0
In an attempt to inject some degree of civility in the con-
versation-despite the fact that, under the CDA's provisions,
the news organization probably cannot be held liable for "unci-
vil" or tortious posts, particularly if they do not moderate the
comments 81-news organizations nevertheless may specify that
posting certain types of speech will violate their "community
rules" and may result in removal of the comments and banning
the poster from the site.82 USA Today's "Community Rules" are
typical:
By accessing and using [discussion forums and blogs], you represent
and agree that you will not:
* Use the Site to post or transmit any unlawful, threatening, ab-
usive, libelous, defamatory, obscene, vulgar, pornographic, pro-
fane or indecent information of any kind, including without limi-
77. See, e.g., Jane B. Singer & Ina Ashman, "Comment Is Free, but Facts
Are Sacred'? User-Generated Content and Ethical Constructs at The Guardian,
24 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 3, 13 (2009) (quoting a print editor who described
the relationship as conversational).
78. Andrew Alexander, Channeling Online Rage, WASH. POST, May 10,
2009, at Al7.
79. There is a distinction between a poster being "pseudonymous"-known
to the readers by an assumed name, often referred to as a "screen name" or
"user name"-and being "anonymous"-using no unique identifier.
80. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Terms of Service (June 10, 2009), http://www
.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/agree.html#g (requiring "certain registra-
tion information"); USA Today, USATODAY.com Terms of Service (Apr. 1,
2009), http://www.usatoday.com/marketing/tos.htm [hereinafter USA Today
Terms of Service] (stating that users wishing to access discussion forums and
blogs must provide identifying personal information).
81. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (noting
that an online provider of information is not deemed to have published the in-
formation of another user).
82. For a comprehensive examination of news organizations' user agree-
ments, see Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Online News: User Agreements and Im-
plications for Readers, 79 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 602, 603-11 (2002).
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tation any transmissions constituting or encouraging conduct
that would constitute a criminal offense, give rise to civil liabili-
ty or otherwise violate any local, state, national or international
law;
* Use the Site to post or transmit any information, software or other
material that violates or infringes upon the rights of others, in-
cluding material that is an invasion of privacy or publicity
rights or that is protected by copyright, trademark or other pro-
prietary right, or derivative works with respect thereto, without
first obtaining permission from the owner or rights holder;
* Engage in personal attacks, harass or threaten, question the mo-
tives behind others' posts or comments, deliberately inflame or
disrupt the conversation, or air personal grievances about other
users.83
The goal of encouraging discussion between readers and
journalists is an elusive one. Although some reporters have en-
thusiastically embraced this opportunity to engage in dialog
with their readers, 84 others have rejected it. For example, The
Plain Dealer in Cleveland, Ohio, revised its commenting policy
in October 2009.85 John Kroll, director of training and digital
development for Cleveland.com, announced that in the future,
the website would "be better about enforcing [the] site's
longstanding community rules" against "racist or otherwise
hate-filled [speech]." 86 But he also acknowledged that:
[W]e're also doing something we should have done earlier: We're join-
ing the online conversation. For too long, we at The Plain Dealer post-
ed stories on cleveland.com and then turned away to focus on the next
day's news. Now, we're encouraging our reporters and editors to pay
attention to what you're saying, to answer your questions and re-
spond to your complaints.87
83. See USA Today Terms of Service, supra note 80.
84. See, e.g., Posting of Erin Rosa to Columbia Journalism Review, Starting
Thoughts, New Media, New Opportunities, http://www.cjr.org/starting-thoughts/
newmedia-new-opportunities.php?page=all (Nov. 19, 2008, 14:17 EST) ("I
can't even count the number of times I have gained valuable news tips from
commenters, some of them leading to award-winning material.").
85. See John Kroll, Plain Dealer Wants Comments-Without the Side Or-
der of Bile, CLEVELAND.COM, Oct. 12, 2009, http://blog.cleveland.com/updates/
2009/10/plaindealerwants comments_--.html (describing the Plain Dealer's
new policy of removing abusive comments).
86. Id.
87. Id. In an interview with Poynter Online, Kroll admitted "[he] was em-
barrassed to tell [readers] that most likely no one read their suggestions .... 'I
don't think there is any point in suggesting that there is any real interactivity
on the site if readers can ask legitimate questions and not get answers most of
the time."' Patrick Thornton, Plain Dealer Creates New Comment Policy, En-
1490 [94:1478
JOURNALIST SHIELD LAWS
The new policy raises the question: what is the relationship
between a reporter and an anonymous online commenter? Is it
akin to the traditional relationship between a reporter and a
source? And, if so, does it trigger legal or ethical obligations to
protect that individual's anonymity?
A. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
The Privacy Policy and/or Terms of Service for most news
organization websites specify that the organization reserves the
right to disclose users' identifying information for various pur-
poses.88 For example, the Terms of Service of STLtoday.com,
the website of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, states: "We have the
right to disclose any information that we believe necessary to
comply with any law, regulation or governmental request or
that information that could prevent or assist in the resolution
of any criminal, illegal, or inappropriate activity."89 Similarly,
the Privacy Policy of the Wall Street Journal and Barron's spe-
cifies that as a general rule, the news organizations will not
share personally identifiable information or related data out-
side of Dow Jones, except under enumerated "Special Circums-
tances."90 These include the need: "to protect the legal rights of
Dow Jones . . . to protect the safety and security of visitors to
our websites; to protect against fraud or for risk management
purposes; or to comply with the law or legal process."91
The Privacy Policy of SFGate.com, the website of the San
Francisco Chronicle, provides:
We may disclose Personal Information to government authorities, and
to other third parties when compelled to do so by government author-
ities, at our discretion, or otherwise as required or permitted by law,
including but not limited to in response to court orders and subpoe-
nas. We may also disclose Personal Information when we have reason
to believe that someone has committed, or will commit, unlawful acts
or acts that endanger the health or safety of another; is causing in-
courages Staffers To Interact, POYNTER ONLINE, Oct. 14, 2009, http://www
.poynter.org/column.asp?id=101&aid=171683.
88. Different websites use different terminology. These include "Terms of
Service," "Privacy Policy," and 'Use Policy Agreement." Although the termi-
nology is often used interchangeably, as will be seen in Sedersten v. Taylor,
No. 09-3031-CV-S, 2009 WL 4802567, at *2-4 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009), dis-
cussed infra, these distinctions can be legally significant.
89. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Terms of Service (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www
.stltoday.com/help/user-agreement.
90. See Wall Street Journal and Barron's Policy, supra note 19.
91. Id.
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jury to, or interference with, our rights or property, other users of the
Web Site, or anyone else that could be harmed by such activities.92
And the Privacy Policy of the Minneapolis Star Tribune
simply states:
We also reserve the right to disclose Personally Identifiable Informa-
tion when deemed necessary or appropriate to comply with the law,
respond to claims, protect our computer systems and customers, en-
sure the integrity and operation of our business and systems, or pro-
tect the rights, property or safety of startribune.com, its affiliates, or
others.93
In contrast to the often dense and lengthy user agreements
of other news organizations, the Minnesota Independent, an on-
line-only newspaper supported by the American Independent
News Network, 94 reduces its privacy policy to two sentences:
"The Minnesota Independent does not share personal registra-
tion information with third-party entities not affiliated with
The American Independent News Network. Your information
will remain private and will be used only in aggregate (not per-
sonally identifiable) terms for site evaluation purposes."95
These policies, despite encouraging users to provide news
organizations with a variety of information, make clear that the
organizations will be the ones to decide what will be disclosed-
and under what circumstances. In other words, as attorney Er-
ic P. Robinson cautions:
[Y]ou're subject to the policies of the platform(s) you use to host your
material, including whether the stated policies (you know, the terms
of use/service and privacy policy that you are bound by, even if you
never read them) are actually followed. In other words, when plat-
forms . . . invite you to make yourselves at home in their house, they
get to set-and change-the rules. 96
92. See S.F. Chronicle Policy, supra note 19.
93. Star Tribune, Privacy Policy for StarTribune.com (May 18, 2009),
http://www.startribune.com/help/l1484516.html.
94. The American Independent News Network also supports news sites in
Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico and Washington, D.C. See The Am. In-
dep., Organization History, http://tainews.org/about (last visited Apr. 13,
2010).
95. Minn. Indep., Privacy Policy, http://minnesotaindependent.com/policies
(last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
96. Posting of Eric P. Robinson to Citizen Media Law Project, Mi Casa Es
Su Casa-But I Set the Rules, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2009/mi-casa-es
-su-casa-%E2%80%94 -i-set-rules (Sept. 21, 2009).
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B. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS VERSUS STATUTORY LEGAL
PROTECTIONS
Given the expansive nature of most Terms of Service and
Privacy Policies, therefore, it might seem surprising that a
news organization would even undertake to notify an anonym-
ous commenter when it received a demand to unmask the
commenter's identity-much less to fight back against the re-
quest. But in a growing number of cases, news organizations
have done just that.97 And in many instances, they have turned
to their states' journalist "shield laws,"98 arguing that the ano-
nymous commenter is the equivalent of a confidential source,
the disclosure of whose identity cannot be compelled.99
However, it is important to note that the journalist shield
laws create a privilege-nearly absolute in a few cases, quali-
fied in others. They do not create a legal obligation for journal-
ists to shield information that they choose to disclose.100 Never-
97. See, e.g., Beal v. Calobrisi, No. 08-CA-1075 (Fl. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2008),
available at http://www.newsroomlawblog.com/uploads/file/Beal-v__Calobrisi
.pdf; Doe v. TS, No. CV08030693, 2008 WL 5683406 (Or. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30,
2008).
98. Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia currently have some
form of shield law. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (Lexis-
Nexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300 to -.25.390 (2008); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2237 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-146t (West Supp. 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320 to -4326
(1999 & Supp. 2008); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4701 to -4704 (LexisNexis 2008);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/8-901 to -909 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-
46-4-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis
2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451 to -1459 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, § 61 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (Lexis-
Nexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 767.5a (West 2000); MINN. STAT.
§§ 595.021 to -.025 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (2009); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (LexisNex-
is 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21, :84A-21a, :84A-21.1 to -21.13 (West
1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (West 2003); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-
06.2 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.11 to -.12 (LexisNexis
2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44.510 to -.540 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942
(West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -.1-3 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-
11-100 (Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010
(West 2009); Hawaii Act of July 2, 2008, H.B. No. 2557 (to be codified at HAW.
REV. STAT. § 621); UTAH R. EVID. 509.
99. See infra Part II.B.1-6.
100. See, e.g., Small v. United Press Int'l, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 7320, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12459, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1989) (noting that the journalist
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theless, in several cases in different states, news organizations
chose to invoke their state shield laws and to fight subpoenas
seeking the identifying information for anonymous commenters
on their websites.
1. Doty v. Molnar (Billings Gazette) (Montana)
Russ Doty, a candidate for the Montana Public Service
Commission, filed a libel and false light invasion of privacy suit
against his opponent, Brad Molnar, for statements Molnar had
allegedly posted anonymously on the Billings Gazette website-
an accusation Molnar denied. 101 Doty contended that even if
the comments had not been posted by Molnar, the identities of
all the posters should be revealed anyway so that they could
serve as witnesses in his case. 102
The newspaper filed a motion to quash, arguing at the Sep-
tember 3, 2008 hearing that the state's shield law103 should be
interpreted to apply to the anonymous commenters on its web-
site, contending that the identities of these individuals were
covered by the statute's absolute prohibition on compelled dis-
closure of the identity of any "source of . .. information."104 The
Gazette also proffered an affidavit from the editor, Steve Pro-
sinski, who stated that allowing anonymous commentary was a
"core service and integral part" of the newspaper's services to
its community. 105
Doty, on the other hand, argued that the anonymous com-
ments did not constitute "news" because they were submitted
privilege attaches to the journalist, not the source of the information); State v.
Ventura, 720 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1999) ("[T]he reporter
shield laws do not prevent disclosure; rather, they permit nondisclosure."). But
see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670-72 (1991) (holding that the
First Amendment did not insulate a news organization from a cause of action
based on promissory estoppel when it revealed the identity of a source who
had been promised confidentiality as a condition of revealing information to a
reporter).
101. See Transcript of Motion to Quash at 19-24, Doty v. Molnar, No. DV
07-022 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.citmedialaw
.org/threats/doty-v-molnar-subpoena-billings-gazette ("Hearing and Oral Rul-
ing on Billings Gazette Motion to Quash" hyperlink).
102. See id. at 22.
103. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903.
104. See Transcript of Motion to Quash, supra note 101, at 3-4, 26 (quoting
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903).
105. Greg Tuttle, Judge: Anonymity Protected, BILLINGS GAZETIE, Sept. 3,
2008, http://billingsgazette.comnews/local/articleca5lda32-2b56-54d6-9dae-2
be9cd5fl543.html.
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after the story had been published online. 06 He urged the court
to apply a multipart test articulated by a federal district court
in a defamation case in Arizona.107 But instead, the judge ruled
from the bench that the Montana shield law required that the
subpoena be quashed, finding that the law was broad enough to
include the identities of the posters. 08
2. Doe v. TS (Portland Mercury and Willamette Weekly)
(Oregon) and Beal v. Calobrisi (Northwest Florida Daily News)
(Florida)
Less than a month after the Montana rulings, judges in
Oregon and Florida applied their states' shield laws 1 09 to strike
down, respectively, a motion and a subpoena seeking to compel
revelation of information identifying anonymous commen-
ters.110 In the Oregon case, a commenter using the pseudonym
"Ronald" expressed support in a comment to a blog about
mayoral candidate Sho Dozono, because, he wrote, Dozono had
severed ties with a local businessman whom he called a "canta-
kerous [sic] obnoxious dishonest new money pig.""' The busi-
nessman, Terry Beard, filed a libel suit against "Ronald" and
subpoenaed both the Portland Mercury and the Willamette
Weekly, which had carried similar anonymous comments on its
website. 112 Clackamas County Court Judge James Redman is-
sued a letter ruling quashing the subpoenas, finding that the
106. See Transcript of Motion to Quash, supra note 101, at 16-17 (noting
that shield laws are not designed "to protect people who come on-line later on
and make some kind of comment").
107. See id. at 8-14 (applying the multipart test to the facts of the pending
motion). The test cited by Mr. Doty is found in Best Western International, Inc.
v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537, 2008 WL 4630313, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006).
108. See Transcript of Motion to Quash, supra note 101, at 30.
109. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.510
to -.540 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
110. See Beal v. Calobrisi, No. 08-CA-1075, at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2008)
(granting defendant's motion to quash subpoena), available at http://www
.newsroomlawblog.com/uploads/file/Beal v Calobrisi.pdf; Doe v. TS, No.
CV08030693, 2008 WL 5683406, at *2 (Or. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008) (denying
plaintiff's motion to compel).
111. Posting of Ronald to Blogtown, PDX, http://blogtown.portlandmercury
.com/2008/01/busy-day-at city_hall_part 2.php (Feb. 1, 2008, 23:08 PST); see
also Posting of Amy J. Ruiz to Blogtown, PDX, Busy Day at Town Hall, Part II,
http://blogtown.portlandmercury.com/2008/01/busydayatcityhall-partL2.php
(Jan. 31, 2008, 17:22 PST).
112. See TS, 2008 WL 5683406, at *1 (denying plaintiff's motion to compel
the identifying information of anonymous posters to the Portland Mercury and
Willamette Week websites).
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Oregon shield law protected the commenter's identity because
it fell within the definition of "information" protected by the
statute, since it was a reaction to the blog topic and thus suffi-
ciently related to protected "news gathering." 113 He noted, how-
ever, that his ruling might have been different had the com-
ment been "totally unrelated" to the original blog post.114
The Florida case involved a subpoena served to the
"Records Custodian/Webmaster" for the Northwest Florida Dai-
ly News in Okaloosa County, seeking identifying information
for an anonymous poster to its site. 115 The presiding judge
ruled that both the nonparty Webmaster and the newspaper
had a qualified privilege against compelled disclosure of the
commenter's e-mail and IP address under the Florida shield
law,116 and that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the
information sought was relevant, material, and could not be ob-
tained from other sources, or that there was a compelling inter-
est requiring disclosure. 17
3. Vinogradov v. Montana State University-Bozeman
(Bozeman Daily Chronicle) (Montana)
In her lawsuit against Montana State University, a profes-
sor filed a motion seeking to depose the Bozeman Daily Chroni-
cle's employees who were most knowledgeable about the identi-
ties of individuals who had viewed or posted comments about
her.118 The professor claimed that deposing the newspaper's
employees was "vital" to her ability to discover the identity of
persons who could have defamed her."19 The newspaper filed a
motion to quash, arguing that the information sought was pro-
tected under the Montana shield law. 120 The court did not reach
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See Beal, No. 08-CA-1075, at 1.
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999).
117. See Beal, No. 08-CA-1075, at 2; see also FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 90.5015(2)(a)-(c) (discussing the required showing by a party seeking to
overcome the journalist's privilege).
118. See Vinogradov v. Mont. State Univ.-Bozeman, No. DV-03-49, at 1
(Mont. Dist. Ct. June 5, 2009), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/
citmedialaw.org/files/2009-06-05-Vinogradov%2ORuling%20on%2OMotion%20
to%20Perpetuate.pdf.
119. See id. at 1-2.
120. See id. at 3.
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the privilege issue, finding that Vinogradov's motion was pro-
cedurally insufficient.121
4. Alton Telegraph v. Illinois (The Telegraph) (Illinois)
A different outcome resulted when law enforcement au-
thorities investigating the murder of a child subpoenaed the Al-
ton Telegraph seeking the names, addresses, and IP addresses
of individuals who had posted comments on a story detailing
the arrest of a suspect. 122 Some of the comments accused the
murder suspect of child abuse and arson.123
The newspaper moved to quash the subpoena in September
2008, arguing that the Illinois shield lawl 2 4 would protect the
identity of the commenters as "sources" of information, and
that information from an online poster is no different from
written or telephoned "tips."125 The Telegraph further argued
that the prosecutor had failed to exhaust alternative sources or
to demonstrate that the information sought was essential to
protect the public interest. 126
But in May 2009, Judge Richard Tognarelli disagreed, rul-
ing that the prosecution had overcome the statute's qualified
privilege because the investigation of the murder of a child was
clearly in the public interest and because the government had
already conducted 117 interviews to try to obtain the informa-
tion elsewhere.127
Even though the court applied the shield law, Judge Tog-
narelli observed that the five commenters, who had posted
their remarks in response after the article appeared online,
could not be considered "sources" under the shield law.128 Judge
Tognarelli added that it was clear that the reporter did not use
information obtained from them in preparing the original ar-
ticle, and that the comments themselves had been made with-
out input from the reporter.129 He expressed skepticism that
forcing the newspaper to reveal information about the identity
121. See id. at 5.
122. See Alton Tel. v. Illinois, No. 08-MR-548, 2009 WL 3334286, at *1 (111.
Cir. Ct. May 15, 2009).
123. See id. at *1-2.
124. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-901 to -909 (West 2003).
125. Motion to Quash Subpoena to the Alton Telegraph at *1-2, Alton Tel.,
2008 WL 7003415 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2008) (No. 08-MR-548).
126. See id. at *3.
127. See Alton Tel., 2009 WL 3334286, at *4.
128. Id.
129. See id.
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of those who post unsolicited online comments would make oth-
er members of the public reluctant to express opinions or pro-
vide information to reporters in the future. 130 Nevertheless, he
struck down the subpoena as to three of the five commenters,
finding that their comments were not sufficiently relevant to
the underlying investigation. 131
5. Abilene Reporter-News (Texas)
In June 2009, a Taylor County District Court judge ruled
that the Abilene Reporter-News would not be compelled to dis-
close the identity of anonymous individuals who had posted
comments about a murder case to defense counsel, who appar-
ently was concerned that they might be called as jurors in the
case.132 Press reports stated that the newspaper cited both the
state shield law' 33 as well as the First Amendment rights of the
commenters.134 Although the defense counsel argued that the
defendant's right to a fair trial should trump the news organi-
zation's statutory privilege, Judge K. Lee Hamilton ruled that
the shield law, which protects "confidential or nonconfidential
unpublished information" as well as its source would apply to
the identities of the commenters. 135
6. Las Vegas Review-Journal (Nevada)
On June 7, 2009, Thomas Mitchell, editor of the Las Vegas
Review-Journal, reported that a story published in May con-
cerning an ongoing federal tax evasion trial1 36 had attracted
nearly one hundred comments, some of them critical of the fed-
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Patrick File, Subpoenas To Unmask Anonymous Internet Users
Continue To Challenge News Media and Courts, SILHA BULL. (Silha Ctr. for
the Study of Media Ethics and Law, Minneapolis, Minn.), Summer 2009, at 1,
available at http://www.silha.umn.edulnews/summer2009.php [hereinafter
Subpoenas To Unmask Anonymous Users]; Posting of Daralyn Schoenewald to
Abilene Reporter-News Online, Judge Rules Names of ARN Online Commen-
ters Do Not Have to be Turned Over, http://www.reporternews.com/news/2009/
jun/19/hearing-held-over-need-to-reveal-arn-commenters/ (June 19, 2009,
10:33 CST).
133. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
134. See Schoenewald, supra note 132.
135. See Subpoenas To Unmask Anonymous Users, supra note 132 (quoting
Judge K. Lee Hamilton).
136. See United States v. Kahre, No. 2:05-cr-121, 2009 WL 1361319 (D.
Nev. May 12, 2009).
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eral prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney J. Gregory Damm.137 A
week after the story appeared, the newspaper received a grand
jury subpoena from Damm's office demanding every record per-
taining to the comments, including all identifying informa-
tion. 138 Mitchell reported that the subpoena advised, "[y]ou
have no obligation of secrecy concerning this subpoena; howev-
er, any such disclosure could obstruct and impede an ongoing
criminal investigation." 139
Mitchell went on to observe that the newspaper does not
require users to register in order to post comments, adding that
"[a] person could use a fictitious name and e-mail address, and
most do."1 4 0 But he also wrote that trying to fight the federal
subpoena would be expensive and probably unsuccessful be-
cause there is no federal shield law.141
On June 17, the newspaper reported that the federal at-
torneys had agreed to limit the subpoena to two commenters
whose remarks "might be construed as threatening to jurors or
prosecutors."14 2 Mitchell was quoted in the story as saying that
he was satisfied with the narrower subpoena, adding that "[wie
will give them what we have, which frankly isn't much, since
most postings are anonymous." 143
Ironically, the Nevada state shield law is regarded as one
of the most protective in the United States, conferring an abso-
lute privilege from disclosure of sources and information in any
proceeding.144 The statute, however, would not apply in a fed-
eral grand jury proceeding.145
137. See id. at *1; Thomas Mitchell, Subpoena Seeks Names-and Lots
More-of Web Posters, LAS VEGAS REV. J., June 7, 2009, http://www.lvrj.com/
opinion/47141327.html.
138. See Mitchell, supra note 137.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Cf id. (suggesting that limiting the scope of the information sought
may be difficult).
142. One of the comments called the jurors "dummies" and said they
"should be hung" if they ruled in favor of the government. Joan Whitely, U.S.
Prosecutors Narrow Subpoena, LAS VEGAS REV. J., June 17, 2009, http://www
.1vrj.com/news/48240147.html. The other wanted to bet that one of the prose-
cutors would not reach his next birthday. Id.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Diaz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 993 P.2d 50, 54 (Nev.
2000).
145. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that the federal common law of
privilege applies to actions based on federal law. See FED. R. EVID. 501; von
Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987).
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C. FEDERAL PROTECTION TO SHIELD ANONYMOUS POSTERS?
In her 2003 article on early cases involving anonymous In-
ternet speakers, Victoria Smith Ekstrand observed that the de-
veloping test for unmasking digital speakers resembled the
three-part test articulated by Justice Potter Stewart in his dis-
senting opinion in the seminal reporter's privilege case, Branz-
burg v. Hayes.146 Similarly, Megan Sunkel analogized ISPs un-
der the CDA "safe haven" to journalists who are subpoenaed to
reveal confidential sources. 147 She urged courts to use the
Branzburg analysis on a case-by-case basis when deciding
whether disclosure of an anonymous source should be com-
pelled.148 Specifically, this would require a showing that the in-
formation sought is relevant, goes to the heart of the plaintiff's
claim, and is unavailable from any other source.149
The narrow holding in Branzburg determined that journal-
ists who witness criminal activity and are called before a grand
jury to testify about it have no constitutional privilege to with-
hold the identity of confidential sources.150 Some courts, how-
ever, adopted a qualified privilege in other contexts.15 For in-
stance, federal appeals courts around the country recognized a
qualified privilege in civil cases to which the journalist was not
a party,152 in libel suitS,153 and even in grand jury investiga-
tions.154 A "qualified testimonial privilege" was similarly sug-
gested in a 1975 law review article by James Goodale, then-
executive vice president of the New York Times, who had acted
as the newspaper's counsel in Branzburg.1"' By the mid-1980s,
most of the circuits had adopted such a privilege.1 6
146. See 408 U.S. 665, 725-52 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Victoria
Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the
First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405, 425-26 (2003).
147. See Megan M. Sunkel, And the I(SP)s Have It .. . But How Does One
Get It? Examining the Lack of Standards for Ruling on Subpoenas Seeking To
Reveal the Identity of Anonymous Internet Users in Claims of Online Defama-
tion, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1197, 1213-14 (2003).
148. See id. at 1215-19.
149. See Branzburg, 408 U.S at 709; Sunkel, supra note 147, at 1218-19.
150. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
151. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972); Cer-
vantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1972); Bursey v. United
States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1972).
152. See Baker, 470 F.2d at 783.
153. See Cervantes, 464 F.2d at 992-93.
154. See Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1076-77.
155. See James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Quali-
fied Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 709, 741-43 (1975). Referring to
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But then, in the early years of the twenty-first century,
federal judges in several circuits began to question the wisdom
of recognizing a constitutionally based privilege. Notably, Se-
venth Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, scorning what he char-
acterized as an "audacious" argument that Branzburg created
some kind of constitutional privilege, wrote that "[w]e do not
see why there needs to be special criteria merely because the
possessor of the documents or other evidence sought is a jour-
nalist." 57
Posner's opinion, although construing a case that did not
involve confidential sources, nevertheless lit the slow fuse that
would explode what some had come to regard as the "myth" of a
constitutionally based reporters privilege. 58 The Judith Miller
case, arising from the decision of a New York Times reporter to
defy a subpoena issued by a grand jury investigating the unau-
thorized disclosure of the identity of CIA operative Valerie
Plame, prompted federal courts in the District of Columbia to
reexamine the scope of the privilege.159 They concluded that
none existed, at least in the circumstances of that case. 60 Mil-
ler spent eighty-five days in jail before agreeing to testify after
her source released her from her promise of confidentiality.161
The fragile house of cards threatened to collapse in other
cases as well. Some arose in criminal proceedings, either seek-
ing journalists' eyewitness observations of criminal activity,162
or demanding that they reveal the identity of sources who had
the five-justice majority as a plurality, Goodale argued that an "enigmatic"
concurring opinion by Justice Lewis Powell accepted the Stewart test. See id.
at 715-18.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir.
1986); LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); Ze-
rilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transameri-
can Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester,
612 F.2d 708, 713-15 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d
433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1975).
157. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2003).
158. See, e.g., Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate
Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter's Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 385, 437 (2006).
159. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965-66
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
160. See id. at 972-73.
161. See Susan Schmidt & Jim VandeHei, N.Y Times Reporter Released
from Jail, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
162. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 F. App'x 430,
432-33 (9th Cir. 2006).
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provided unauthorized access to information sealed by court
order.163 Others involved civil Privacy Actl 6 4 lawsuits brought
against the federal government, claiming that personal infor-
mation was leaked to the press in violation of the statute.165 In
each case, the subpoenaing entity claimed that the news media
were not the target, but rather the conduit making it possible
to identify the violator of the prohibition against disclosure of
information, thereby eliminating any possibility that the re-
porters could assert the Fifth Amendment as grounds for refus-
ing to testify.166
Faced with the prospect of jail, fines, or both, the news me-
dia reluctantly concluded that the time had come to turn to
Congress for a remedy: a federal shield law.16 7 A variety of bills
were introduced in both houses, protecting journalists from be-
ing forced to reveal confidential sources in the majority of cir-
cumstances, and creating a qualified privilege for news gather-
ing materials that would not disclose a confidential source. 168
Exceptions would include situations where disclosure was ne-
cessary to prevent an "act of terrorism" or other significant
harm to national security, imminent death or significant bodily
injury, or to identify persons who had disclosed trade secrets or
certain personal or financial information protected by federal
law. 169
But the drafters of the bills struggled to describe exactly
who would be covered by the statute. Attempts to craft a defini-
tion in terms of institutional affiliation met with howls of pro-
test from the blogosphere.170 Adopting a "functional" approach,
163. See, e.g., In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2004); In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
165. See, e.g., Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hat-
fill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2007).
166. See Lee, 413 F.3d at 59-61; Hatfill, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
167. See, e.g., Editorial, Toward a Federal Shield Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2007, at A22 ("This measure of protection is long overdue.").
168. See, e.g., Free Flow of Information Act, S. 448, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009);
Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 985, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
169. S. 448 H§ 4-5; H.R. 985 § 2(a)(3).
170. See, e.g., Posting of Robert A. Arcamona to Protecting the Source, http:l
protectingthesource.blogspot.com/2009/10/hyper-local-journalists-home-cookin
.html (Oct. 9, 2009, 14:54 EST); Posting of Clothilde Le Coz to MediaShift, http://
www.pbs.org/mediashift/2009/10/why-bloggers-and-citizen-journalists-deserve-a
-shield-law287.html (Oct. 14, 2009); Posting of Michael Lindenberger to Citizen
Media Law Project, Federal Shield Bills Offer Rival Takes on Who's a Journal-
ist; Bloggers Could Be Left Unprotected, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/
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some of the bills defined the "covered person" as one who is
"engaged in journalism," further defined as the "gathering,
preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, writing, edit-
ing, reporting or publishing of news or information that con-
cerns local, national, or international events or other matters of
public interest for dissemination to the public."171
The bills were vigorously opposed by the Bush Administra-
tion's Justice Department, 172 and, much to the media's surprise
and chagrin, initially failed to attract unqualified support from
the Obama Administration as well.173 But by December 2009, it
appeared that a compromise had been reached that satisfied
the intelligence community as well as the media interests. 174
The Senate bill, protecting persons "engaged in journalism," 7"
was voted out of the Senate Judiciary Committee fourteen to
five. 176 Assuming the bill passes in the full Senate, it will still
have to be reconciled with the House version. But Senator Ar-
len Specter told the Associated Press that the Senate bill
"creates a fair standard to protect the public interest, journal-
ists, the news media, bloggers, prosecutors and litigants."177 Of
course, just because a blogger is protected by the shield law
does not mean there is any guarantee that the identity of an
anonymous poster also would be. Whether this kind of informa-
tion would be protected under a federal shield law remains an
open question.
D. STANDING TO ARGUE ON BEHALF OF AN ANONYMOUS
POSTER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In the absence of a shield law or favorable common law
precedent, would a news organization have standing to chal-
2009/federal-shield-bills-offer-rival-takes-whos-journalist-bloggers-could-be-left
-unprotected (Feb. 23, 2009).
171. S. 448 § 8(5); H.R. 985 § 4(2).
172. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 20, 23-28 (2007) (statement of
Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy).
173. Posting of Cristina Abello to The Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, Obama Administration Publicly Dissatisfied with Senate's Federal
Shield Bill, http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=11049 (Oct. 1, 2009,
17:05 EST).
174. Associated Press, Senate Committee Passes Shield Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2009, at A23.
175. See S. 448 § 8(2)(A).
176. See Associated Press, supra note 174.
177. Jim Abrams, Senate, White House Agree on Reporter Protections, ABC
NEWS, Oct. 30, 2009, http://abenews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=8957954.
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lenge a subpoena seeking a poster's identity on the ground that
disclosure would threaten that individual's First Amendment
rights? Although there are few cases on this issue, some com-
mentators suggest that "the trend among those courts pre-
sented with the question is to hold that entities such as news-
papers, ISPs and website hosts may, under the principle of jus
tertii standing, assert the rights of their readers and subscrib-
ers."178
In a case of first impression, a Pennsylvania federal dis-
trict court ruled that a newspaper had standing to assert the
rights of commenters to post anonymous comments on its me-
dia website." 9 The case arose after the Pocono Record pub-
lished a story about a workplace sexual harassment and retali-
ation lawsuit that attracted reader comments which, the
plaintiff claimed, suggested personal knowledge of the parties
or circumstances involved in the suit.Is When the plaintiff
subpoenaed the newspaper for identifying information, the
court granted the motion to quash.181
The court concluded that the relationship between the
newspaper and the commenters allowed the Pocono Record to
assert their First Amendment rights, particularly because of
the difficulty they would have in doing so without also unmask-
ing themselves.182 The court observed that the newspaper "will
zealously argue and frame the issues before the Court."18 3
On the merits, the court utilized the "good faith" standard
from 2TheMart.com,184 determining that although the subpoe-
na was issued in good faith and sought relevant information,
that same information would be available through "normal, an-
ticipated forms of discovery," such as depositions of other em-
ployees.185 The opinion noted that application of the standard
allowed it "to resolve the present issue on narrow grounds" and
did not require it to "determine the full extent of the First
Amendment right to anonymity" in the case. 86
178. Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 18, at 4-5.
179. Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-cv-1934, 2008 WL 5192386, at
*4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008).
180. Id. at *1.
181. Id. at *6.
182. Id. at *3-4.
183. Id.at*4.
184. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
185. Enterline, 2008 WL 5192386, at *5.
186. Id. at *4.
[94:14781504
JOURNALIST SHIELD LAWS
A year later, a federal district court in Missouri went even
further when faced with a similar question.187 Plaintiff John D.
Sedersten filed a civil lawsuit against the City of Springfield,
Missouri, its police chief, and another former police officer,
Morris Taylor, claiming that he had been physically assaulted
by Taylor at the Greene County jail on May 29, 2008, and that
the City and police chief should have known that Taylor was
dangerous and that his employment jeopardized the health and
safety of inmates at the jail.188 The local newspaper, the News-
Leader,189 published an article online on August 1, 2009, dis-
cussing the county prosecutor's decision to drop the criminal
assault charges against Taylor.190 A pseudonymous poster, us-
ing the screen name "bornandraisedhere," posted the following
comment criticizing the county's prosecuting attorney:
Yep, it's Darrell Moore doing his finest work. Here is Taylor who did
[ten] years of good service for the city and then goes serves [sic] our
country. He tries to get help for some problems when he gets back but
goes unheard and is put back on the streets. Then he make [sic] a
mistake and lets his emotions get the best of him. His whole career is
over. Then the alleged victim is unwilling to testify but Moore and his
staff still wants [sic] to use him as an example. All in the meanwhile
one of the prosecutors [sic] family members get [sic] numerous felony
counts of selling drugs dropped. Way to run that office.191
Sedersten subpoenaed the News-Leader, demanding that it
disclose the identity of "bornandraisedhere."192 His motion to
compel argued that this information might help him establish
that the City knew about "Taylor's dangerous proclivities," be-
cause "if 'bornandraisedhere' knew about Taylor's issues, cer-
tainly Chief Rowe and other city officials knew or should have
known."193 Sedersten contended that his need for the informa-
187. Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV, 2009 WL 4802567, at *3 (W.D.
Mo. Dec. 9, 2009).
188. Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production
of Documents at 2, Sedersten, 2009 WL 4802567 (No. 6:09-CV-03031), availa-
ble at http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/sedersten-v-springfield-news-leader.
189. The News-Leader is published by Gannett Missouri Publishing, a sub-
sidiary of the same company that owns the Wausau Daily Herald. See Citizen
Media Law Project, Sedersten v. The Springfield News-Leader (Dec. 16, 2009),
http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/sedersten-v-springfield-news-leader.
190. Dirk VanderHart, Charges Dropped Against Taylor, SPRINGFIELD
NEWS-LEADER, Aug. 1, 2009, at A5.
191. Sedersten, 2009 WL 4802567, at *1.
192. Id.
193. Suggestions in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Documents Requested in Subpoena at 4-5, Sedersten, 2009 WL 4802567 (No.
6:09-CV-03031), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/sedersten-v
-springfield-news-leader.
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tion trumped the First Amendment rights of anonymous
speech. 194
Significantly, Sedersten relied on the News-Leader's Terms
of Service and Privacy Policy to bolster his demands, making
the novel argument that because the user agreements granted
the newspaper a license in any material posted, and reserved to
it the right to use personal information "in any way and for any
purpose" and to disclose it to third parties, the pseudonymous
poster had waived the First Amendment right to anonymous
speech by posting a comment to the website. 195 In its brief op-
posing the motion to compel, the News-Leader countered that
the Terms of Service "relate only to the use of posted material-
not the identity of the poster."196 Conceding that the comment
itself was not protected from disclosure, the newspaper con-
tended, "it is the anonymity of the poster that the First
Amendment protects."'
The News-Leader went on to argue that, rather than con-
stituting a waiver, the Privacy Policy and the registration pro-
cedure of the newspaper were specifically intended to protect a
poster from being "haled into court as a witness or a defendant
simply by posting a comment." 198 Its registration procedure
does not even require a user to provide a first or last name, or
an address or telephone number, because, the newspaper
claimed, "doing so would only serve to chill the free exchange of
ideas and opinions that the News-Leader's online forums seek
to promote." 199
In his opinion denying the motion to compel, District Judge
Gary A. Fenner, while acknowledging that anonymous speech
does not enjoy absolute protection, nevertheless concluded that
because the posting involved political speech, the request for
disclosure would be subject to heightened scrutiny. 200 He dis-
tinguished this subpoena of this nonparty poster from the line
of cases permitting compelled disclosure of the identity of a po-
tential libel defendant. 201 Citing the test from 2TheMart.com,
194. Id. at 1-7.
195. Id. at 5.
196. Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production
of Documents, supra note 188, at 10.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 11.
199. Id.
200. Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV-S, 2009 WL 4802567, at *2 (W.D.
Mo. Dec. 9, 2009).
201. Id.
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Fenner ruled that Sedersten had failed to meet his burden.202
Although the judge found that Sedersten was probably seeking
the identifying information in good faith, he rejected the argu-
ment that the information was central to the case, finding that
it was merely cumulative.203
But more importantly, the court rejected the waiver argu-
ment.204 There is a presumption against waiver of constitution-
al rights, Fenner wrote, and anyone who does so by contract
"must be made aware of the significance of the waiver."205
In this case, Plaintiff relies upon two sentences in a two-page docu-
ment in which the overarching theme is that information provided by
a user of the site may be used for various commercial purposes. Noth-
ing on the face of the privacy policy even hints a user may be waiving
his or her constitutional right to anonymous free speech by posting
comments or materials on the News-Leader's website. Given the pre-
sumption against waiver and the boiler-plate language Plaintiff relies
upon, it cannot be said that the anonymous poster was aware he or
she may be waiving the right to free speech, let alone the significance
of such waiver.206
III. THE ETHICS OF PROTECTING AN ANONYMOUS
POSTER'S IDENTITY
As many of these cases illustrate, news organizations that
host websites recognize that permitting anonymous (or pseudo-
nymous) postings encourages robust debate and helps promote
the First Amendment interest of "protect[ing] unpopular indi-
viduals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression."207
As News-Leader executive editor Don Wyatt stated in the affi-
davit accompanying the brief opposing the compelled disclosure
of a user's identity, "these forums are designed to promote the
free exchange of ideas and opinions... . The News-Leader does
not require users' personal information because it recognizes
the value of anonymous speech."208
On the other hand, as Cleveland Plain Dealer columnist
Connie Schultz points out:
Anonymity on the Web offends most journalists I know, and not just
because their own names go on everything they write. It breaks every
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *3.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
208. Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production
of Documents, supra note 188, at ex. A.
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rule newspapers have enforced for decades in letters to the editor,
which require not only a name and a city of residence, but contact in-
formation to confirm authorship. 209
Media ethics scholars also have expressed concern. As a
general proposition, journalists are-or at least, should be-
reluctant to grant anonymity to news sources. The Society of
Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics advises reporters to
"[i]dentify sources whenever feasible. The public is entitled to
as much information as possible on sources' reliability . . . . Al-
ways question sources' motives before promising anonymity."210
And yet, as New York Times executive editor Bill Keller
has said, prohibiting the use of any anonymous sources by re-
porters "is high-minded foolishness. Without the option of pro-
tecting sources, with recourse only to an increasingly redacted
public record, the coverage of government and other powerful
institutions would tend more and more toward press-conference
stenography."211
Which brings us back to the question: are anonymous post-
ers equivalent to confidential news sources? A newsroom law-
yer would probably argue that no one who voluntarily posts to a
newspaper's website could expect confidentiality. Anonymous
commenters should be bound by the terms of the applicable us-
er agreement, thus precluding any claim either for breach of
contract or under a theory of promissory estoppel if the identi-
fying information was disclosed to a third party-
notwithstanding judicial skepticism that a user could be ex-
pected to have read, digested, and consented to them.212 And
judges might follow the lead of Illinois Judge Tognarelli, who
declined to equate those who post comments anonymously after
an article is published with those who serve as confidential
sources during the news-gathering process. 2 1 3
209. Connie Schultz, Web Sites' Anonymity Brings out the Worst in Some
Posters, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 27, 2009, http://www.cleveland.com/schultz/
index.ssf/2009/09/websitesanonymity-.bringsout.html.
210. SOC'Y OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, supra note 20, at 1.
211. See GENE FOREMAN, THE ETHICAL JOURNALIST 214 (2010).
212. But see Ekstrand, supra note 82, at 608 (questioning whether these
"adhesion contracts" serve public policy interests).
213. See Alton Tel. v. Illinois, No. 08-MR-548, 2008 WL 7003415, at *5 (Ill.
App. Ct. May 15, 2009). In his opinion, Judge Tognarelli cited an earlier Illi-
nois appellate case, People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 624 (App. 2001), for
the proposition that "the legislature clearly intended the privilege to protect
more than simply the names and identities of witnesses, informants, and other
persons providing news to a reporter." Id.
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Many reporters and editors do, nevertheless, consider
themselves morally, if not legally, obligated to protect the ano-
nymity of online posters, and as this discussion has demon-
strated, are prepared to fight hard to avoid disclosing identify-
ing information. Returning to the Society of Professional
Journalists' Code of Ethics, this could simply be an extension of
the principle requiring journalists to "act independently," and
to avoid the appearance of taking sides in a dispute or assisting
the government in an investigation. 214 Or it could hearken back
to the perceived ethical duty of journalists to promote not only
their own rights under the First Amendment, but those of their
readers as well.
One editor who attempted to argue this point ended up
spending thirteen days in jail-albeit long before the era of
anonymous online commentary. 215 In 1996, Bruce Anderson,
editor of an alternative weekly newspaper in Boonville, Cali-
fornia, was found in contempt after he refused to surrender to
prosecutors the original copy of a letter to the editor written by
a criminal defendant for use as evidence in his murder trial. 216
Anderson had published the text of the letter in the newspaper,
but the trial judge in Mendocino County ruled that only the
original letter could be introduced as evidence. 217
Anderson refused, claiming that he should be protected by
the California shield law and that if he provided the document
to the government, other readers would be discouraged from
submitting their own letters. 218 His lawyer, according to the
New York Times, argued that "[olur position is that anything
that interferes with the free and private exercise of the letters-
to-the-editor concept has what the courts call a chilling effect
and that's the free-speech issue." 219 Anderson's brother, Rob,
was quoted as saying: "You don't like the authorities fishing
around in your letters file . . .. It has an intimidating effect on
your correspondence." 220
But that argument did not persuade the trial judge. Be-
cause the letter had already been published, it was not pro-
214. Soc'Y OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, supra note 20, at 1.
215. See Carey Goldberg, Eccentric Editor Is Jailed over Letter in Paper,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at A10.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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tected by California's shield law, which only covers reporters'
notebooks and confidential notebooks. 221 The California Su-
preme Court, with one justice dissenting, refused to hear An-
derson's appeal. 222
The New York Times story about the case included this ob-
servation:
It may seem curious that such a fuss would be made over a letter that
was meant to be public anyway, but the explanation lies in the nature
of The Anderson Valley Advertiser, an utterly independent-minded,
often potentially libelous publication that specializes in no-holds-
barred political discussion, often by way of anonymous letters.223
That sounds remarkably like the situation for many news
websites today.
IV. THE WISDOM OF SHIELDING ANONYMOUS POSTERS
Media ethicist Patrick Lee Plaisance has asked whether
"new electronic forms of communication pose fundamentally
new ethical questions."224 He adds that "[]egal and moral re-
sponsibility is often difficult to assess because of the open,
democratic, and often anonymous nature of online postings,
bulletin boards, and other types of cyberspace forums." 2 2 5 As a
matter of principle, if not of legal obligation, many news organ-
izations have chosen to protect the identity of their anonymous
posters. But the decision to do so is fraught with complications.
In their article, Shielding Jane and John: Can the Media
Protect Anonymous Online Speech?, attorneys Ashley I. Kissin-
ger and Katharine Larsen ask a series of important questions:
An evaluation of whether the company is well positioned to advocate
for a particular poster's right to anonymity raises numerous ques-
tions. Is the company in possession of information that could identify
the poster? Does the company have the legal, financial, and practical
ability to oppose the subpoena? Do business considerations weigh in
favor of asserting the rights of the poster? What type of speech is at
issue? What test will a court in that jurisdiction apply to account for
the First Amendment right of the poster? Can and should the poster
be notified of the subpoena? Does the poster's identify come within
the ambit of a state shield law? Even if it does, should that law be in-
221. Id.
222. Anderson v. Mendocino County Superior Court, No. S053554, 1996
Cal. LEXIS 2774, at *1 (Cal. May 22, 1996).
223. See Goldberg, supra note 215.
224. PATRICK LEE PLAISANCE, MEDIA ETHICS: KEY PRINCIPLES FOR RE-
SPONSIBLE PRACTICE 127 (2009).
225. Id.
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voked? What other grounds can be asserted in support of a motion to
quash?226
To these questions, we could add several others. How likely
is it that courts in other states, with different types of shield
laws (or no shield laws at all) will take the expansive view of
the Montana and Oregon courts? 227 Will that question turn on
their interpretation of specific statutory language or case law,
as judges are asked to decide whether anonymous commenters
are confidential sources, or whether their identities can be con-
sidered confidential information? Will judges focus on the na-
ture of the relationship between the poster and the news organ-
ization, and whether users have any reasonable expectation
that their identities will be kept secret?
Assuming there is a privilege, whose privilege is it, any-
way? Limited case law has held that the privilege belongs to
the reporter, or to the news organization, or both, but not to the
source. 228 This authority holds that the source cannot waive the
privilege if the news organization wishes to assert it, or per-
haps more pertinently, that the source cannot use the privilege
to protect information that the news organization chooses to
reveal.229 A news organization facing a subpoena for this infor-
mation might hesitate to be the test case to determine the con-
tours of the privilege in a particular jurisdiction, not least be-
cause of concerns that an adverse ruling could affect the
viability of a reporter's shield in other contexts. As one long-
time practitioner and expert in the law of reporter's privilege
has observed:
While protections for anonymous Internet speakers are important in
the digital age, it is dubious that anonymous posters should be pro-
tected by more stringent tests than anonymous journalistic sources as
is often the case. Indeed, a reporter appears to have a stronger imper-
ative than an Internet service provider to maintain confidentiality:
she is not only guarding her source's anonymity, but also represents
the interest of the public in protecting the reporter-source relation-
ship and the newsgathering process, in order to foster the free flow of
information via the press.230
226. Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 18, at 9.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08, 110-14.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir.
1980); Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 103 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D.D.C. 1984); L.A. Mem'l
Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'1 Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489, 494 (C.D. Cal.
1981); State v. Boiardo, 416 A.2d 793, 798 (N.J. 1980).
229. See, e.g., Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147; Palandjian, 103 F.R.D. at 413;
L.A. Mem? Coliseum Comm'n, 89 F.R.D. at 494; Boiardo, 416 A.2d at 798.
230. James C. Goodale et al., Reporter's Privilege: Recent Developments
2008-2009, in 2 COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2009, at 129 (PLI
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Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co. that the First Amendment would not preclude an
"outed" source from suing under a promissory estoppel
theory, 231 it seems unlikely, given the nature of most user
agreements, that a viable claim could be made that a news or-
ganization has a legal duty to assert a journalist's privilege in
order to protect an anonymous commenter. 232 So it would ap-
pear from a legal perspective, at least, that a news organization
with a tightly crafted user agreement would have nothing to
fear from the courts by simply surrendering identifying infor-
mation in response to a subpoena from a litigant or a prosecu-
tor.
Which brings us back to our starting point: absent a legal
duty and a clear privilege, why would, or should, news organi-
zations attempt to invoke a privilege to protect anonymous
posters online? The pragmatic answer would be: to encourage
more traffic to the website and to avoid the harsh invective of
the blogosphere, as experienced by the Wausau Daily Herald233
and the Las Vegas Review-Journal.234 But perhaps the better
answer is that invoking the privilege is what journalists in-
stinctively do. Protected by the First Amendment themselves,
they value it. They recognize that their ability to do their jobs
depends on their right to keep some information confidential.
They also recognize that the right to speak freely and anony-
mously is essential to public discourse. The fact that it is now
taking place in the online environment does not change that
principle.
Of course, the question that remains is whether pseudo-
nymous posts on a news website genuinely enhance political
discussion and debate. Clearly, many online commenters are
hardly the heirs of Thomas Paine or the authors of the Federal-
ist Papers who used the pseudonym "Publius" to conceal their
identities and to focus attention on the merits of their argu-
Intellectual Property, Course Handbook Series No. G-987), available at WL
987 PLI/Pat 113.
231. 501 U.S. 663, 670-72 (1991).
232. But see ELLIOTT C. ROTHENBERG, THE TAMING OF THE PRESS: COHEN
V. COWLES MEDIA COMPANY 249 (1999) (arguing that the Cohen decision could
represent "a necessary and overdue restoration of balance" between the rela-
tive power of the media and the public).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 136-41.
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ments. 235 But who is to say that their "outrageous" speech is
not worthy of protection?236 And if the speech is worthy of pro-
tection, it follows that the identities of the speakers must be as
well. Whether the courts will decide that the news media will
be their primary sword, or shield, to prevent that unmasking
remains to be seen.
235. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) ("[A]nonymity has
sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.").
236. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53-54 (1988) (hold-
ing that defendant magazine had a First Amendment right to publish outra-
geous caricatures of public officials).
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